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POINT I.
THIS COURT HAS IMPROPERLY SUBSTITUTED ITS
FINDINGS FOR THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT.
This Court found or assumed "facts" which (1) were not
found by the trial court, and/or
evidence in the record.
A.

(2) are not supported by any

This is error.

The Trial Court Made No Finding Of A Loan.

The trial court made no finding that defendants had
negotiated a loan and that such loan was the source of funds to ,
be paid plaintiff.

The Trial Court's findings regarding the

check delivered to plaintiff were

(1)

that "defendant then re-

quested that Mr. Petty retain the check for two days while he
made arrangements for the check to clear the bank," and

(2)

"two days later .•. defendant notified Neuman C. Petty by telephone that arrangements had been made for the check to clear
the bank"

(Findings 10 and 11, R. 91).

The trial court's find-

ings did not include findings as to the "arrangements," whether
from the defendants' own funds or from some other source.
In contrast to the findings of the trial court, this
C our t s ta t ed :
Pursuant to the parties' conversation of January 31,
1979, defendant agreed that, for a release of the
judgment upon payment of a lesser agreed amount, he
would negotiate a loan with a third party to enable
him to pay off the substitute obligation immediatelY·
(Supreme Court opinion, p. 4., emphasis added.)
We note that, in the present case, defendant agreed ~
incur additional indebtedness pursuant to the terms
the accord, in reliance on plaintiff's promise to
accept immediate payment of a lesser amount in full
satisfaction of the underlying obligation. (Supreme
Court opinion, p. 5., emphasis added.)

or
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The foregoing findings are inconsistent with those of the trial
court.

As such, this Court has substituted its judgment for

findings of the trial court, the finder of fact.

This is error.

The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to
defendants,

shows the arrangements made by defendant with Zions

National Bank were that the bank would honor defendant's check
when it was presented for payment.

Had the check been present-

ed for payment, the bank would have made a loan to defendants.
However, the check was never presented to the bank for payment
and therefore no loan was ever made to defendants.

Thus the

supposed consideration to support the accord and satisfaction
failed.
B.

The Trial Court Made No Finding That Defendants

Agreed To Obtain A Loan.
The parties agreed that plaintiff would accept the sum
of $2,200 in full settlement and satisfaction of the judgment,
whereupon defendant made and delivered his check in said sum
(Findings 5 and 6, R. 90).

The agreement was for defendants to

pay what they were already legally obligated to pay plaintiff,
which does not constitute new or adequate consideration.
Notwithstanding the

absence of any finding by the

trial court of an agreement to obtain a loan, this Court in its
opinion at least twice referred to such an agreement.

See

Point I.A, above.
Even if the agreement were that defendant would obtain
a loan from the bank, defendant did not fulfill the promise or
agreement because defendant, at most, arranged for the bank to
( 3)
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honor his check when presented for payment.

The check was

never presented; thus, the loan was never made.
C.

The Trial Court Made No Finding Of Detriment or

Injustice To The Defendants.
There is no evidence to support a finding of detriment
to the defendants, referred to in this Court's opinion (Supreme
Court opinion, p. 5).

Defendants suffered no legal detriment

since no loan was ever made to them by the bank.
Since the trial court made no finding of detriment and
since there is no evidence to support such a finding, the
agreement was not supported by consideration.

This Court

should so hold.
POINT II.
THE BURDEN OF PROVING AN ACCORD AND
SATISFACTION WAS ON DEFENDANTS; THIS COURT
PLACED THE BURDEN ON PLAINTIFF
The burden of proving an accord and satisfaction is on
the party claiming it.

A sufficient defense thereto is a

ing that it was not entered into fairly and honestly.

~™·

The

trial court's findings, especially 6, 7, 8 and 9, conclusively,
establish that the accord and satisfaction was not consummated
fairly and honestly.

Instead, this Court has placed upon

plaintiff the burden of establishing fraud, relieving defendants of the burden which is theirs.

This is error.

POINT III. THIS COURT ERRED IN HOLDING DEFENDANT
HAD NO DUTY TO DISCLOSE DEFENDANTS' PROPERTY AND
THAT THE TITLE COMPANY WAS HOLDING MONEY PENDING
THE RESOLUTION OF PLAINTIFF'S JUDGMENT.
This Court held defendant had no duty to disclose to
plaintiff the defendant's property and the sale thereof.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~~r

the circumstances of this case, such holding is erroneous, for
the following reasons:
A.

The Particular Circumstances in this Case Imposed

upon Defendant a Duty to Speak.
Defendant Eugene L. Anderson was served with a motion
and order in Supplemental Proceedings requiring him to personally appear before the Trial Court on February 20, 1979.

As

such, he was under court order to appear and testify regarding
his property.

Defendant Anderson was anticipating the closing

of a sale of real property in which he had a one-half interest
as a tenant in common, and from which he was to receive $2,000
after payment of the underlying indebtedness (Finding 6, R.
90).

Defendant knew that plaintiff's judgment had been docket-

ed as a judgment lien upon all real property belonging to defendants or in which they had an interest in Sevier County
(Finding 7, R. 90).

The purchase price for the property had

actually been received by the title company, and the amount had
been paid to obtain a conveyance of the property being sold
from a larger parcel which defendant was purchasing.

The

$2,000 that was to be the defendant's share from the sale was
being held by the title company because of plaintiff's judgment
(Tr. 17, 19).

In that sense, the money being held actually

belonged to plaintiff as a result of its judgment lien.
Because defendant knew the title company was holding
money because of plaintiff's judgment lien, defendant had a
~ty

to disclose such fact to plaintiff, which defendant knew

was without knowledge of such fact.
( 5)
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Defendant's duty to disclose also arises because of
the Order in Supplemental Proceedings.

Defendant was under

court order to appear and testify under oath regarding his
property.

Defendant knew he would be required to testify re-

garding his property,

including the fact of the sale.

Defe:n-

dant withheld or concealed the facts to reach a settlement with
plain ti ff so he would not have to appear for the Order in Supplemental Proceedings.
B.

Having Made Representations, Defendant Was Under a

Duty to Reveal, Fully and Fairly, the Facts.
Having discussed his financial condition with plaintiff, defendant was under a duty to give a complete and fair
disclosure.
C.

Defendants' disclosure to plaintiff was incomplete.
Defendant Had a Duty to Speak Because the Facts

Were Not Equally Knowable to Both Parties.
Where the facts are not equally within the means and
knowledge of both parties, there is a duty of disclosure by

t~

party with superior knowledge. This obligation was on defendant
in this case.
POINT IV. THIS COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
DEFENDANTS STATEMENTS WERE MISLEADING AND
MISREPRESENTED THE FACTS AND LAW; DEFENDANTS
BANKRUPTCY WOULD NOT HAVE DISCHARGED PLAINTIFF'S
JUDGMENT LIEN UPON THE REAL PROPERTY.
In the course of the conversation between plaintiff
and defendant regarding settlement of the judgment against de·
fendants, Eugene Anderson "asserted that he was contemplati~
bankruptcy, and that such a measure would result in plaintiff's
judgment being discharged."

Plaintiff's judgment had been doc·
(6)
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__.I

keted as a judgment lien upon all real property belonging to
defendants or in which they had an interest in Sevier County.
This was the only judgment lien docketed against defendant's
real property.

Defendants statement regarding the effect of

bankruptcy upon plaintiff's judgment was false and misleading.
In terms of the bankruptcy law, plaintiff was a secured creditor, its claim secured by a judgment lien on defendant's real
property.

Bankruptcy would not discharge the judgment lien.

This Court's opinion would give sanction to this misstatement,
a result which should not be intended.
statement,

Because of the mis-

intentional or unintentional, the agreement was

voidable and plaintiff voided the contract.

This Court should

have so held.
CONCLUSION
Sugarhouse Finance Company respectfully requests a
rehearing of this case, for the foregoing reasons.

This

Petition is supported by a Brief in Support of Petition for
Rehearing.
Respectfully submitted this

6th day of May, 1980.

MOYLE & DRAPER

Wayne G. Petty
Attorneys for Plaintiff
600 Deseret Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah

( 7)
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